A decision maker observes a noisy signal of the quality of a project before deciding to accept or reject the project. We show 1-As the amount of noise increases, the minimum signal required for acceptance may either increase or decrease, and may be nonmonotonic. 2-Consequently, the average quality of accepted projects may either increase or decrease in the amount of noise. 3-The effect of increased noise on decisions depends in a straightforward way on which kind of mistake leaves the decision maker worse off, a rejection of a good project or an acceptance of a bad project.
Introduction
A decision maker decides whether to accept or reject a proposal based on noisy information about the proposal's merits. For example, a C.E.O. decides which capital budgeting proposals to fund, and which to reject. A consumer decides whether or not to agree to an expensive car repair recommended by his mechanic. A quality control manager decides whether or not the available evidence merits a recall. In each case, the decision maker has some, but not all, of the information relevant to his decision. This paper investigates the relationship between the amount of noise, or unknown information, and decision making. Specifically, we show that there is not necessarily any straightforward relation between noise and decision making. As noise increases, the decision maker may become more lenient, tougher, or may even vary his behavior non-monotonically. Consequently, our results predict that, for example, a C.E.O. may allocate either more or less capital towards his old division (whose proposals are observed with less noise). A quality control manager may become either more or less likely to issue a product recall as the quality of his information decreases. Either may behave non-monotonically as noise increases.
Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests a complicated relationship between noise and decision mak- another 24% upon his announcement of a transformative new retail strategy. That he was fired only 17 months later suggests the reaction to his hiring indicated a preference for noise rather than a belief he was supremely competent. Democratic congressman Gene Taylor, in explaining his vote for John
McCain over Barack Obama in the 2008 election, offered "Better the devil you know" as an explanation, 2 apparently willing to choose a candidate farther from his own beliefs in return for lower noise.
Our model directly addresses the inconsistent relationship between the amount of noise and decision making in these examples, by showing that more noise may be either an inducement or a deterrent in accept/reject decisions.
A simplified version of our model conveys the main idea of our paper. Suppose that a C.E.O. must accept or reject projects of two types, A and B. Suppose that any project will generate a profit drawn from a U [−2/3, 1/3] distribution, regardless of its type. The C.E.O. wishes to accept profitable projects, and reject unprofitable projects. Finally, suppose that the C.E.O. is an expert on type A projects, and so can observes a signal which is strongly correlated with the true quality. Suppose further that he knows little about type B projects, and thus observes a signal which is weakly correlated with true quality. Now, consider the limiting cases: a type A projects signal is perfectly correlated with quality, while a type B project's signal has zero correlation. In this case, he will accept 1/3 of type A projects (those with quality above 0), while rejecting all of the type B projects, regardless of signal. Therefore, even though his prior is that the two types of projects are of equal quality, he accepts more type A projects because he can observe their true qualities with greater accuracy. However, if the profit distribution were instead U [−1/3, 2/3], then the C.E.O. would accept all type B projects, while accepting only 2/3 of type A projects. In this case, he rejects more type A projects precisely because he can observe their true qualities with greater accuracy.
The relationship between degree of information asymmetry and decision making has not gone unnoticed by the literature. Glaser et al. (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura (2013) empirically find that C.E.O.'s allocate capital disproportionately to managers with whom they have informal connections. Glaser et al. (2013) finds that this practice results in inefficient allocation of capital and therefore lower profits, whereas Duchin and Sosyura (2013) find a more mixed result. Specifically, the latter paper finds that the effect of this apparent favoritism is deleterious to profits in certain types of firms (those with weak governance, low manager ownership, and low institutional holdings), yet increases profits at other types of firms (firms with high variance in analysts' earnings forecasts, indicating high information asymmetry). The interpretation in Duchin and Sosyura (2013) Both Duchin and Sosyura (2013) and Glaser et al. (2013) ably summarize a body of theoretical literature which considers settings in which information asymmetry within a firm introduces frictions in capital allocation (cf. Meyer et al. (1992) , Bernardo et al. (2001), and Wulf (2009) ). These papers generally predict that divisions with greater information asymmetries receive a lower amount of capital. Our contribution to the this literature is to point out that the amount of investment may increase or decrease in information accuracy, a result that has heretofore gone unnoticed in the literature.
Apart from capital budgeting, several empirical papers examine the effect of information asymmetry on decision making. French and Poterba (1991) find that investors prefer stocks from their home country to foreign countries. Levin (2001) finds that greater information asymmetries may increase or decrease the gains from trade. In scientific publishing, journal editors disproportionately publish papers authored by colleagues and former graduate students (Bardhan (2003) ). Ang et al. (2013) find that C.E.O.'s favor segments they are more familiar with when making divestment decisions and offer evidence that the reason for this apparent favoritism is that C.E.O.'s are more informed about these segments. Our paper characterizes conditions under which noise negatively and positively influences decision making.
A decision maker makes accept/reject decisions on projects. Project quality q is unobservable ex ante, but DM observes a noisy signal s which is correlated with q. Specifically, assume that
, where z > 0 is a measure of the noise of the signal. For example, a C.E.O. may have more accurate information about the true quality of proposed projects that come out of his old division than he does about those outside his area of expertise. Similarly, a referee of an academic journal observes quality with relatively lower noise the closer a paper is to his own research. A ISO certification body may observe the performance of companies with well-defined, structured tasks with less noise than those with many workers with non-specific responsibilities. A quality control manager samples output, deciding whether or not to recall an entire batch of product.
Suppose that, prior to observing the signal s, DM's belief is that that quality of any project is drawn from the following distribution:
Assume there is a threshold q 0 , such that for q ≥ q 0 , DM prefers to accept projects, while for q < q 0 , DM prefers rejection. Specifically, suppose that DM's objective is to minimize the expected value of the following loss function:
where a > b (if b ≥ a, DM will always accept). The loss function in (2) assumes that DM does not care about the magnitude of q − q 0 , the amount by which a given project exceeds or falls behind the threshold q 0 (this case is addressed in section 3). Within the class of loss functions with this property, (2) is without loss of generality. 4 In particular, parameters a and b measure the relative loss from to two types of error: accepting a bad project and rejecting a good project. Let
If x > 1 (x < 1), this means that DM incurs a relatively greater (lesser) loss from accepting a bad project (rejecting a good project). As DM's decision is binary, his accept/reject decision depends 3 Assuming a zero mean is without loss of generality. If the mean of the prior distribution is µ > 0, then q 0 should be understood as q 0 − µ. 4 To normalize a loss function with four parameters, subtract L(accept|q ≥ q 0 ) from all values and divide all values by
Equation (2) results.
only on x, and not on a and b separately. Importantly, we will show that the monotonicity of DM's decisions with respect to signal noise depends on whether or not x > 1.
The case of a normally distributed signal centered around quality distributed with a normal prior is one of several conjugate distributions with a known posterior (see Casella and Berger (2002) , page 326). Specifically, a Bayesian decision maker will have the following posterior belief of the quality of a project, denoted by F z s :
posterior belief of q conditional on s:
The mean of F z s is decreasing in signal noise z, while the variance is increasing. Clearly, it is optimal for DM to follow a threshold strategy, accepting projects if and only if s ≥ s * z . We characterize the behavior of s * z as z increases, and show it may be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotonic in z. 
Solving the model
The derivative of s * z with respect to z depends on the sign of Φ −1 1 1+x , which is negative if x > 1, positive if x < 1, and 0 if x = 1. If x < 1, (2) implies that mistakenly accepting an inferior project is less costly than mistakenly rejecting a superior project. From (6), an optimizing DM will set s * z so the probability that a project with a marginal signal in the neighborhood of s * z will be a failure is about 1 1+x
. Therefore, if x < 1, marginal projects are more likely to be failures than successes. This is entirely due to the preferences of the decision maker; as he values avoiding errors of one type (rejecting good projects) more than he does errors of another type (accepting bad projects), he shades in the direction of a more lenient threshold, so as to make the first type of error relatively less likely. It turns out that whether the probability of failure of a marginal product is above or below , an increase in the variance of the posterior distribution caused by an increase in signal noise z will increase the size of the right tail of the posterior distribution, meaning that for an unchanged cutoff s * z , a marginal project is relatively more likely to succeed. A DM with x < 1, however, is particularly worried about rejecting a good project than accepting a bad one. Hence, he optimally responds to the increase in the variance by making it easier for a project to be accepted, and increases threshold s * z . On the other hand, if x > 1, and the probability of failure for a marginal project is optimally set to be below 1 2 , an increase in the variance of the posterior distribution increases the left tail of the distribution and thus increases the probability a marginal project is a failure. Such a DM, relatively more concerned with accepting a bad project, responds by decreasing the threshold s * z . Finally, in the special case of x = 1, DM is equally concerned with both types of errors, and therefore sets the probability of failure of a marginal project to be exactly . Hence, an increase in the variance of the posterior neither increases nor decreases the probability of failure, so no adjustment to the threshold s * z is necessary. In this case, s * z = q 0 (1 + z), and s * z is clearly monotonically increasing in z.
Characterizing DM's acceptance threshold: non-monotonicity
Therefore, we separate the problem into four cases:
Case 1: Equation (5) holds and x ≥ 1: DM rejects based on prior, and it is relatively more costly to accept a bad project than to reject a worthy project.
Case 2: Equation (5) holds and x < 1: DM rejects based on prior, and it is relatively more costly to reject a worthy project than to accept a bad project.
Case 3: DM accepts based on prior, and x ≥ 1 Case 4: DM accepts based on prior, and x < 1
We find that only in cases 1 and 4 is DM's optimal threshold s * z monotonic in z. In cases 2 and 3, an increase in noise may prompt DM to either increase, or decrease his standard s * z . The result follows directly from inspection of equations (5) and (7), and the fact that the sign of Φ • Case 1 (DM rejects based on prior and x ≥ 1): s * z increases monotonically to ∞.
• Case 2 (DM rejects based on prior and x < 1), s * z first decreases, then increases to ∞.
• Case 3 (DM accepts based on prior and x ≥ 1), s * z first increases, then decreases to −∞.
• Case 4 (DM accepts based on prior and x < 1), s * z decreases monotonically to −∞.
Proof: From (7), the derivative of s * z is given by:
Note that . In 1.A, both terms of (8) , and in subcase 4.B,
. Both are mirror images of subcases 1.A and 1.B, respectively, and so identical reasoning gives us that in each case, (8) is negative for all z.
We now turn to two numerical examples to illustrate intuition behind the possible non-monotonicity of s * z , illustrated in figures 1 and 2. Suppose that DM rejects based on his prior (i.e. (5) holds). An increase in z has two effects on DM's posterior distribution, F z s . First, it decreases the mean, and second, it increases the variance. The first effect causes s * to increase regardless of the value of x (figures 1 and 2 both illustrate this effect, the former for x = 2 and the latter for x = 1 3
). However, an increase in the variance may spur either an increase or a decrease in s * , depending on whether or not
The reason is that for x ≥ 1, the cutoff s * z is set so that the probability that a marginal project will be a failure is about
Figure 1: An illustration of case 1 of proposition 1. Starting from z = 1, x = 2, q 0 = 1, and DM rejects based on prior, the probability that a marginal project will be a failure is
. An increase in z has two effects. One, the mean of the posterior distribution F , q 0 = 1, and DM accepts based on prior, the probability that a marginal project will be a failure is
. An increase in z has two effects. One, the mean of the posterior distribution F z s decreases, meaning that s * must increase to balance equation (6), shown in figures 2b and 2c. Two, the variance of F z s increases, enlarging the tails of the distribution and decreasing the area to the left of q 0 = 1, meaning that s * must decrease to balance (6). The second effect is show in figures 2d and 2e. Contrast the example of figure 2 with that of figure 1.
Under (5), the right-hand side of (9) approaches 0 as z → ∞, monotonically if x ≥ 1. The possibility of non-monotonicity follows from the numerical example in Figure 3 .
A symmetrical proof follows in the case that (5) does not hold (cases 3 and 4 in the statement of the proposition). Figure 3 illustrates cases 1 and 2 of Proposition 2. In Figure 3a , = 1, q 0 = 0, x = 1.7, and DM prefers to reject projects based on his prior alone. For z = 0, DM perfectly observes quality and so accepts half of all projects, given q 0 = 0. As z increases, given that x > 1 (case 1), s * z increases monotonically, and so Ψ(z) decreases monotonically to 0. In Figure 3b , = 1, q 0 = 1, and x = .3, DM prefers to reject based on his prior (case 2). In this case, s Figure 3: Illustration of cases 1 and 2 of proposition 2. In figure 3a (case 1), the overall fraction of projects accepted, Ψ(z), decreases monotonically to 0 as z increases -increasing noise always means that DM accepts fewer projects. In figure 3b (case 2), Ψ(z) first increases, then decreases to 0 as z increases -an increase in signal noise from point A to point B causes DM to increase the fraction of projects accepted, while an increase from point B to point C causes DM to decrease the fraction accepted.
It follows from proposition 2 that the average quality of accepted projects is also not necessarily monotonic in signal noise z. This means, for example, that the profitability of capital projects approved by a C.E.O. may increase or decrease in noise. This provides another explanation for the divergent empirical results discussed in section 1.
Discussion
One implication of our non-monotonicity result is that no particular empirical relationship between noise and fraction or quality of projects accepted. This is because the monotonicity of any outcome with respect to noise depends on x, an preference parameter. As x is unobservable, either a monotonic or a non-monotonic relationship between signal noise and acceptance standard can be expected empirically. Even in cases where it is clear that (5) holds or does not hold (for example, an academic journal which rejects well over half of its submissions could be fairly said to reject papers based on its prior belief alone), an empirical prediction can only be made for the limiting case as
A second implication is that there is no clear relationship between the amount of noise and the likelihood of acceptance for a project of any given quality level q. Hence, a strategic submitter should not necessarily favor a decision maker who can judge the quality of his project with more or less noise. This is true regardless of whether the submitter believes that the true quality is above or below q 0 .
A reader might wonder about the role of risk aversion in explaining our results. The loss function (2) parameterizes two types of risk in relative terms: the risk of accepting a bad project, and the risk of accepting a good project. This results in an endogenous aversion to risk, as described by equation (7). Were DM to additionally have preferences over the absolute level of risk (suppose noise z entered as an argument in DM's utility function, with utility decreasing in z), the result would be to decrease threshold s * z for any value of z. Importantly, risk-aversion alone is therefore not capable of explaining the non-monotonicity we study in our model. To make this point especially clear, we assume a decision maker minimizing his expected loss throughout. Finally, our model relies on the case of a normally distributed signal centered on quality, which has a normally distributed prior. What about other distributions? The tractability of our model comes from the case of a normal prior and signal having a known posterior distribution (also normal), and from the relative tractability of normal random variables. For arbitrary prior/signal distributions, the Bayesian posterior is generally unknown, meaning that no relationship between decision making and signal noise can be ruled out. Other conjugate distributions (see Casella and Burger (2002) , page 326) generally produce an intractable posterior. One partial exception to this is the case of a Pareto prior and uniform signal. Readers interested in this case should refer to the working paper version of this paper.
Within the normal-normal model considered in his paper, two extensions present themselves.
First, what happens when the loss function (2) is generalized so that DM cares about the amount by which q exceeds or falls short of q 0 ? In the case of a linear loss function, in which DM incurs a fixed cost from rejecting a paper, but a loss q 0 − q from acceptance, DM's acceptance standard s * z moves monotonically in z. As discussed in section 2, the non-monotonicity observed in the main model is an artifact of a DM optimally setting the probability of failure of a marginal project above or below 1 2
, depending on his preference parameters; this does not happen in the linear loss case. Second, it is worth considering the discrete version of our model, in which true quality is binary (w.l.o.g., say quality is equal to −1 w.p. , and that q 0 = 0), and the observed signal s 6 For a full treatment of the linear loss case, see the working paper version of this paper.
